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Abstract: Using data from the medical literature on age-specific and family-history specific
incidencerates, we develop double-decrementmodels to evaluatethe actuarial impact of a family
history of breast cancer or ovarian cancer, and the impact of a positive test for the BRCA gene
mutation. Increased forces of mortality are derived. It is found that females with some family
histories of cancer and/or the presence of the BRCA mutation cannot be accepted at standard
rates; depending on underwriting practice, most cases could be accepted at substandard rates.
Then a Markov model is built to evaluate the likely effect of adverse selection resulting from
women taking a genetic test without informing their insurer and consequently modifying their
insurance purchase behavior. It is concluded that, at current testing rates, adverse selection
should not be a major source of concern if companies apply strict underwriting rules, requesting
cancer history and ageat onset for all first degreerelatives.
Keywords: Term Insurance,Breast and Ovarian Cancer, Genetic Testing, Adverse Selection
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1. Genetic Testing and the Fear of Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is a major source of concern for insurance companies because asymmetric
information could result in huge underpricing. The recent developmentsin the Human Genome
Project, while exciting from a biological standpoint, have further increased insurer fears about
this issue. In many jurisdictions, insurers are not allowed to ask for results of genetic testing.
Several years ago, the gene mutations which affect the likelihood of developing breast and
ovarian cancer were discovered; commercial tests to detect the presence of these gene mutations
are now available. Women who learn through genetic tests that they are at higher risk of death
for breast or ovarian cancer may purchase more insurance, which to them looks inexpensive
since it is priced at rates set for average risks. Women who learn they are at lower risk after a
negative test may purchase less insurance. These two forces combine to increase the aggregate
mortality of the purchasers of insurance. If insurers do not have access to the test results, they
are unable to identify which women are at higher risk and which are not. They have to increase
premiums for everyone, driving those at lower risk out of the pool. This creates a spiral of
increasing prices and decreasing number of policies issued, that may threaten the financial
solvency of the insurer.
The debate about insurer access to genetic screening information has industry
representatives pointing to the risk of adverse selection. They advocatemandates which require
that all test results provided to individuals also be made available to insurers. This insurers’
request for a “level playing field” contrasts with opposite efforts by consumer groups to increase
the privacy protection of genetic information. Consumers are concerned that test information
may find its way to employers and result in employment and social discrimination. They fear
that the use of genetic testing by insurers could result in the creation of a biological underclass of
uninsurable individuals.
The issue is highly emotional and very political. Underlying conflicts in fundamental
values have prompted legislators to regulate the use of genetic testing. Wisconsin was the first
state to introduce a genetic testing law in 1992. Seventeenstates now have enacted laws
prohibiting insurers of different types from using genetic information in their underwriting
decisions. As of early 1998, over 200 bills have been proposed in various state legislatures
throughout the country that try, in one way or another, to limit insurers’ access to and use of
genetic information (Jones, 1998.)
Until very recently, the actuarial profession had not contributed much to the debate. This
situation is changing as both the Institute of Actuaries andthe Academy of Actuaries now have a
genetic testing task force. The December 1998 issue of the North American Actuarial Journal is
devoted entirely to the proceedings of the 1998 Bowles Symposium on genetic technology and
underwriting. This issue contains a pioneering paper by Macdonald (1998), who uses a Markov
model to estimate the impact of adverse selection. Macdonald does not refer to any particular
disease or genetic test, and the parameters of his models are consequently estimated rather
crudely. In this paper, we use Macdonald’s seminal approachto quantify the impact of a family
history of breast and/or ovarian cancer, and the impact of a positive test for the BRCAl and
BRCX! genemutations. In section 2, we restate the main results of a working paper (Lemaire et
-182-

al, 1999), that estimates the effect of family history and gene mutations on forces of mortality
and on the costs of term insurance. In section 3, a Markov model is presented to evaluate the
financial consequencesof adverse selection. Section 4 concludes,

2. Increased Forces of Mortality in the Presence of a Family History of Breast or Ovarian
Cancer, or in the Case of a BRCA Mutation.
This section summarizes recent work by Lemaire et al (1999), who provide an actuarial insight in
the genetic testing debate by quantifying the impact of family history of breast cancer (BC),
ovarian cancer (OC), and BRCAIR mutations on forces of mortality and on term life insurance
costs.
The vast majority of BC and OC is the result of diet, lifestyle, environmental exposures,
social interactions, and other factors, known and unknown. For instance, a late age at first
childbirth and an early first menstruation slightly increase the likelihood of developing BC (Gail
et al, 1989.) Women with more pregnancies, or longer use of oral contraceptives, or who
underwent tubal litigation or hysterectomy, have a reduced probability to develop OC (Hartge et
al, 1994.) However, some cancers are inherited. A small percentageof women (estimates range
from one woman out of 833 to one out of 100) has a dominant mutated gene called BRCAl or
BRCA2 (Ford et al, 1995.) Women with a BRCA mutation are at extreme risk to develop BC or
OC. Estimates of the probability to develop either of these cancers by age 70 are as high as
0.945 (Easton et al, 1995.)
Approximately one in nine women in the United States will develop BC in her lifetime;
one in forty will die from the disease (American Cancer Society, 1992.) Probabilities to develop
BC, as a function of age and family history, have been obtained by Claus et al. (1994). For
instance, Table 1 indicates the predicted cumulative probability of BC for a woman who has a
mother or sister affected, by age of onset of this first-degree relative. Onset is defined as the
moment BC is diagnosed.
Table 1. Cumulative Probability of BC for a Woman who has One First-Degree Relative
Affected with BC, by Age of Onset of the Affected Relative
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Survival probabilities exhibit exponential decay: the annual probability that a woman
affected with BC will die from the disease is 0.036, irrespective of the time since diagnosis and
age at onset (SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1973-1995,and authors’ calculations.)
OC is less prevalent, but deadlier: 1.8% of women will get the disease. The risk is
multiplied by 5.4 in the presence of family history (Hartge et al, 1994). Survival rates are low,
but improving. In 1973, only 59.9% of the women who developed OC survived the first year
after diagnosis. The five-year survival rate was 36%, the 20-year rate 30.1%. In 1992, 78.3% of
affected women survived their first year with OC (SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1973-1995).
Applying Taylor’s separationmethod to OC survival rates (Taylor, 1977), the present-day tiveyear survival rate was estimatedto be 50.9%, and the 20-year rate 36.3%.
Estimates of the penetrance (the percentage
of thosewith the genemutationwho will
developBC) of BRCAl/2 vary from 56%to 85%,asthereis a hugeethnicdiversityin the sites
of mutations.Thiswiderangeof estimates
is typicalof themedicalcancerliterature.Wewish
our estimates
of increased
forcesof mortality andtermpremiums
to be conservativethornthe
insurer’sperspective,i.e. our figuresshoulderr on the high sideratherthan on the low side.
Therefore,an averagepenetrance
of 65% was selected,as a conservative(Lowden,1998).
BRCA mutationsnot only increasethe probabilityof developingBC, they alsoleadto earlier
cancers.TheCancerandSteroidHormoneStudy,1980-82,
estimated
thattheageat onsetof BC
for womenwithout the mutationis normallydistributedarounda meanof 68.99yearsand a
standarddeviationof 15.39. With BRCA mutations,themeanageat onsetdropsto 55.435,
whilethestandard
deviationisunaffected(Clauset al, 1994.)
Estimates
of the likelihoodto developOC for a womanwith a BRCA mutationvary
widely, from 11%to 84%,depending
onthe typeof mutation,thespecificalleleof BRCAl, and
the populationunder.study(Eastonet al, 1995,Ford et al, 1994,Struewinget al, 1997). An
averageof 40%seems
conservative.
Basedon thesemedicalestimates,
an actuarialmodelwasbuilt to evaluatethe increased
deathprobabilityof awomanwith a family historyof BC or OC,or with a BRCAmutation,and
theresultingincrease
in thenetsinglepremiumof terminsurance.
Firstthesurvivalprobabilities
for femalesgivenby theUS Decennial
Life Tablesfor 1989-91,
published
by theUS Department
of HealthandHumanServices,werefitted to a Makehamdistribution.Thenexcessforcesof
mortalitywerecalculatedusinga double-decrement
model,andfittedwith a quadraticfunction.
Table 2 presentsthe p-ratio,the ratio of the force of mortalitywith family history or a gene
mutationto thebaseline
forceof mortality,for a 30-year-old
woman.
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Table2: p-ratios with a family history of BC or OC, or with the BRCA mutation, for a 30-yearold woman (FDR = first-degree relative; SDR = second-degreerelative; age at onset for BC: 2029

It is seen that excess mortality can exceed 100% in some cases of family history of BC,
and 225% for a woman with a BRCA mutation. While some females with a family history of
cancer can be acceptedat standard rates, others needto be quoted sub-standard rates. Depending
on the underwriting policy of the company, females with the gene mutation can possibly be
covered, at a rate incorporating a severe mortality surcharge. Note that the common assumption
that a given disease simply multiplies forces of mortality by a multiplicative constant (constant
frailty hypothesis) doesnot apply in the caseof BC and OC. Table 3, extracted from
Brackenridge
andElder (1998),showsthat thesemortality increases
are comparable,
or even
higher,thanincreases
resultingfromcommondiseases.
Table3. Mortality Ratiosfor Common
Diseases
1DISEASE
IM
Systolicbloodpressure

Smoking
Smoking
HIV

Average(men)
40cigarettes/day
(men)
35-year-oldmale
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1.70
2.00

50.00

3. Adverse Selection Costs
3.1.

Markov Model

A continuoustime, discretestate,Markov modelis developedhereto represent
the actuarial
environmentof geneticscreening.The model,shownin Figure 1, decomposes
the natural
historyof anindividualinto a series
of discretestates,thatdecompose
terminsurance
purchasing
andgenetictestingdecisions.
At all times,everyindividualis assigned
to oneandonly onestate.
Transitions
fromonestateto anothercanoccurat anytime. At time0, a womanmaybein either
State1 or State2. A womanin State1 hasnot beentestedfrom BRCA mutationsandhasno
insurance.
A womanin State2 hasnotbeentested,but hasinsurance.FromState1, sevenfUure
statesare possible:Shecan remainuntestedandpurchaseinsurance(State2); shecan test
negativeandbuy insurance
(State4); shecantestpositiveandbuy insurance
(State5); shecan
testnegativeandremainuninsured
(State12);shecantestpositiveandremainuninsured
(State
13);shecandiebeforegettingtestedor becoming
insured(State14);or shecanremainuntested
andwithoutinsurance
(State1). Correspondingly,
elevent%turestatesarepossiblefromState2.
Each stateis represented
by an ellipsein Figure 1. The possibletransitionsfrom onestateto
anotherarerepresented
by arrows. Most transitionshavecashflow implications.Transitions
into States2 and4 through11imply insurance
premiumpayments.Weassumed
thatpoliciesare
purchased
throughnetsinglepremiums.Transitions
fromStates2 and4 through11into State14
imply insurance
benefitpayments.
OneMarkov modelcanbedefinedfor everysingleageof thepopulationunderstudyat
time 0, andfor everypossiblefamily history. We shallconsiderthreeinitial ages(30, 40, and
50) andfour family histories(noBC or OCin thefamily; oneFDRwith OC;oneFRDwith BC,
onsetage20 to 29;two FDRwith BC, onsetages20to 29for both),resultingin 12subgroups
or
12differentMarkovmodels.At timezero,womenareassumed
to beunaffected
by BC andOC.
Weshallassume
thatthedemand
for insurance
isinelasticto price. If thisis notthecase,
the determination
of the forcesof transitionwouldbe very complex,asthey are expectedto
changeover time. If adverseselectionoccurs,moreindividualsat higherrisk will purchase
insurance,
purchase
insurance
with largerbenefitamounts,
or holdontothat insurance
for longer
periods,increasing
the financialexposureof insurance
companies.Thatshoulddrive insurance
premiumsup. In turn, this shoulddecrease
the transitionprobabilitiesinto statesthat reflect
insurance
coverage(States4 through1l), because
highercostswill drive somewomenout of the
market. To the extentthat this increase
in premiums
preferentiallydrivesout womenwho test
negativeor remainuntested,
whichiswhatinsurance
companies
fear,premiums
will continueto
risein thespiralof adverseselection.
3.2.

Thiele ‘s Equations

Assumethat the populationis subdividedinto subgroups,
accordingto familyhistoryof OC or
BC. Followingthe notationof Macdonald(1998),the (continuous
time) forceof transitionat
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time t from State j to State k, for subgroup i, is denoted ,D:,‘,” (in the sequel superscript i will be
omitted.)
For each State, we wish to calculate, under a variety of assumptions, the actuarial present
value of future payments, incorporating mortality and interest. This expected value, called the
benefit reserve, is a liability to the company. The insurer is indifferent between paying the
benefit reserve and insuring the risk. As the reserves for the various States are dependent, their
values can only be found by solving a set of differential equations, Thiele’s equations for benefit
reserves. One differential equationcan be written for each State for which there is an outward
transition. The equationfor Statej, is written:

where
y,(‘lj

Benefit reserve for Statej at time f

vWk Benefit reserve for Statek at time t
t
4

Force of interest at time t

4jk

Payment due upon transition from Statej to Statek.

ik
Pt

Forceof transitionfromStatejto Statek at timet.

The interpretationof the differentialequationis asfollows: at all times,the reserveincreases
throughinterestaccrual.Upona transitionfromj to k, a benefitb,!’ mightbepaid. In our case
thiswouldonly happenfor a transitioninto State14, whena deathbenefitis to be paidto an
insuredindividual. Switchingfrom Statej to Statek alsoimpliesthereleaseof thereservefor
Statej andacquiringthereservefor Statek.
Thissetof differentialequations
canbe solvedbackwardrecursively,usingthe boundary
conditionsV,(1j.i
1 -_ 0, wheret* is the endingtimefor the periodunderconsideration.In other
words,theinsurancecompany,at time t*, needsno longerto hold fundsasidefor this policy,
because
thepolicy termandthecorresponding
financialobligations
haveended.
Thebenefitreserveis theexpectedvalueof futurepayments.Higherordermoments
can
y
(‘I’
the
moment
of
order
q
about
the
origin
alsobecomputed.Norberg(1995)hasshownthat
for Statej, isthe solutionof thesetof differentialequations

k:j
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Variances, coefficients of variations, and Pearson skewness coefficients can then easily be
calculatedfrom these moments.
We are interested in the implicit cost of adverse selection, the costof adverseselection
andgenetictestingin the market. To calculatethis, we first solvethe differentialequations,
assuming
no alloweduseof genetictestingby insurers.Womenflow throughthesystemat the
basecasetransitionratesandexperience
mortalityat ratesbasedonly on their familyhistory,the
informationwhichtheinsurerusesfor pricingpurposes.
Thisgivesusthe expected
presentvalue
of costsin the“no genetictesting”case.Wethensolvethesamedifferentialequations,
assuming
genetictestingandallowingwomento flow throughthesystemat thesamebasecasetransition
rates. However,the transitionrateswill nowbe mortalityratescorresponding
to the woman’s
BRCA status,if sheistested(baseline
mortalityif negative,BRCAmortalityif positive,)andto
herfamily history,if sheremainsuntested.Thisgivesustheexpectedpresentvalueof costs,in
the genetictesting- full informationcase.Theratio of thesetwo measures
yieldsthe implicit
costof adverseselection,theratioof whatthetrueriskisto whatis claimedandcharged.
Implicit Cost of Adverse Selection =

EV( full information)
EV(allowable information)

3.3. Initial Behavioral Assumptions

Estimatesarenecessaryfor eachforceof transition.Transitionsinto State 14 (Dead)
reflectmortality,which we estimateusingthe procedure
outlinedin section2. Thesemortality
ratesdiffer by age,familyhistoryandBRCA status.Theothertransitions
involvea combination
of testing behavior,test resultsand insurancepurchasingbehavior.Reasonable
basecase
estimates
for thesetransitions
will beassumed,
erringon thesideof cautiousness
The following behavioral transitionintensitieswere selectedfor our benchmark
calculations.
l

Rate ofinsurancepurchasepy

Fromindustryfigures(ACLI, 1997)thisratewasestimated

to be5%.
l

Rate of genetic testing r. Very few womengettestedpresently:only 250womenhavebeen

testedat the Universityof Pennsylvania
sincethetestbecameavailable,late in 1996. The
testisvery expensive
($2,400)andnot coveredby medicalinsurance.Thepriceof thetestis
not expectedto decrease
dramatically,asone laboratoryownsthe patent. To be on the
conservative
side,arateof 5%wasselected.
l

Force of interest. Denotedas6, we assume
a forceof interestof 5%.
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Test results. Theprobabilityp that a testresultwill bepositivedepends
on the sub-group:a
womanwith two first-degree
relativesaffectedby BC is muchmorelikely to havetheBRCA
genethana womanwith no family historyof the disease.The valueof this probabilityis
foundby introducingtheconstraintthatexpectedbenefitsneedto beequalin the two cases:
(1) no genetictesting;and(2) womenget testedbut their insurance
purchase
decisionsare
not affected. This resultsin p=O.O05for a womanwith no family history,p=O.OSfor a
womanwith onefirst-degree
relativeaffectedwith OC, ageat onsetunknown.For a woman
with onefirst-degree
relativeaffectedwith BC, onsetage20-29,p=O.15;for a womanwith
two first-degree
relativesaffectedwith BC, bothwith onsetage20-29,p=O.40.
Insurance benefits. Thebaseline
amountof terminsurance
is assumed
to be $1. A woman

buying “lessinsurance”
alwaysreducesher benefitamountfrom $1 to $0.50;for a woman
buying “more insurance,”we considerincreased
benefit amountsof $2, $4, or $10. A
womanlapsingherinsurance
policy ceases
to beinsured.
Insurance
decisions
areassumed
to occurshortlyafterthe
testresultisprovided.Benchmark
probabilities
wereselected
asfollows:
Insurance purchase probabilities.

’ If uninsured
andtestpositive:
’ If uninsured
andtestnegative:
’ If insuredandtestpositive:

’ If insuredandtestnegative:

P(buyinsurance)
= 0.25
P(notbuy) = 0.75
P(buyinsurance)
= 0.03
P(notbuy) = 0.97
P(moreinsurance)
= 0.27
P(same
insurance)
= 0.70
P(lessinsurance)
= 0.02
P(lapse
policy) = 0.01
P(moreinsurance)
= 0.02
P(same
insurance)
= 0.75
P(lessinsurance)
= 0.18
P(lapse
policy) = 0.05

Transitionratesarethenobtainedby multiplyingthe appropriate
ratesandprobabilities.For
instance,
pi.” =r*(l-p)*0.97.

3.4.

Costs of Adverse Selection, by Family History

Themodelwasrun,usingtheinitial behavioralassumptions,
for thefour family historiesunder
consideration.
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Table 4. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with No Family History of BC or OC,
Insured at Onset.

Adverse selection only has a minuscule impact for a woman who has no family history of BC or
OC. This is due to the fact that the probability of having the gene, for a woman with this
particular family history, is only 0.005. Insurance companies should not be overly concerned
with restrictions of the use of genetictesting information for women with no family history.
Table 5. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with One First-Degree Relative
Affected with OC, Age at Onset: Unknown, Insured at Onset.
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For a woman with one first-degree relative with OC, potential adverse selection costs are
non-negligible, as they exceed 10% in some cases. We reach a similar conclusion as Macdonald
(1998): the main costs of adverse selection do not result from the lapsing behavior of the women
who test negative; it results from the women who select very high benefit levels following a
positive test.
The longer the duration of the policy, the higher the adverse selection costs. Obviously,
longer terms give women more opportunities to get tested and make insurance-related decisions,
and more time to develop OC or BC and die.
Adverse selection costs are always higher for an initial age of 40. Women who are
cancer-free at the age of 30 are unlikely to develop BC or OC before the age of 50, and even
more unlikely to die from the disease during that 20-year period. Women who are 50 at time
zero are more prone to developcancer than women who are 10 years younger, but it is also much
more probable that they die from other causes, so that the adverse selection cost, which is a ratio,
is lower.
Table 6. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with One First-Degree Relative
Affected with BC, Age at Onset: 20-29, Insured at Onset.
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Table 7. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with Two First-Degree Relatives
Affected with BC, Ages at Onset: 20-29, Insured at Onset

Adverse selection costs are the highest in the last two cases, reaching 20% in some cases. There
is a substantial probability that the gene mutation is present in the family in the two cases;
consequently the result of the test provides a lot of information.

3.5.

Introducing Fraud.

The abovetablesassumed
that womenreportedtheir family history truthfully. Now let us
considerthe impactof fraud. Assumea womanwith 2 FDR with BC reportsno family history,
andtheinsurerfailsto detectthisfraud.
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Table 8. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with Two First-Degree Relatives
Affected with BC, Ages at Onset: 20-29, Insured at Onset, Who Claims no Family History of BC
or OC.

50

2
4
10

1.1469
1.1878
1.3090

1.2909
1.3865
1.6670

1.3704
1.5138
1.9305

1.3669
1.5339
2.0151

Adverse selection costs are huge in this case. It is of crucial importance for insurance carriers to
request detailedfamily information (including age at onset) during the underwriting process, and
to investigate the applicant’s statements vigorously.

3.6. Very Conservative assumptions.

Thebenchmark
behavioralhypotheses
specifiedin 3.3. assumed
a highdegreeof inertia. Most
womendid not changetheir insurance
purchase
behaviorfollowingthe resultsof the test. We
nowassume
majorbehavioralchanges,
decreasing
theprobabilityof keepingthesameamountof
insurance
by 50%andadding50%to eachprobabilitywhichaffectstheadverse
selection.
’ If insuredandtestpositive:
’ If insuredandtestnegative:

P(moreinsurance)
= 0.77
P(same
insurance)
= 0.20
P(lessinsurance)= 0.67
P(same
insurance)
= 0.25

Table9 showsadverseselectioncostsunderthis setof conservativeassumptions,
for a woman
with oneFDR with BC. As expected,theadverseselection
costsaresizable.
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Table 9. Implicit costs of adverse selection for a Woman with One First-Degree Relative
Affected with BC, Age at Onset: 20-29, Insured at Onset.
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3.7. Women uninsured at time zero.

Finally, adverseselectioncostsareestimated
for a womanuninsured
at timezero (i.e., in State1
at t=O). As shownin table10,costsarehigherfrom State1thanfromState2. This conclusion
wasalsoreachedby Macdonald(1998):the populationcurrentlyuninsured
may leadto higher
coststhantheinsuredpopulation.
Table 10. Implicit costsof adverseselectionfor a Womanwith One First-DegreeRelative
Affectedwith BC, Ageat Onset:20-29,Uninsuredat Onset.

3.8. Coejicient of variation; skewness coefficient

All preceding
resultswereobtainedcomparing
meancostsundera varietyof assumptions.
Table
11 showsstandarddeviations,coefficientsof variation, and skewness
coefficients,in one
particularcase.An increased
benefitof 10wasselectedto maximizethe increase
of the higher
moments.Table11 showsthat the impactof genetictestingon secondandthird momentsis
quitelimited.
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Table 11. Mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and skewness coefficient of the present value of claims,
with I First-Degree Relative affected with BC, Age at onset 20-29, Insured at Onset. Increased benefit = 10.

50

S.D.
C.V.
Skewness

.154149
8.5061
24.3324

.165657
8.9019
26.2882

(No GT = use of genetic tests results not allowed)

.238732
6.1204
17.9645

.273345
6.5508
18.0224

.307314
4.8354
13.6399

.36043 1
5.1627
13.0250

.361884
3.9410
10.8068

.420125
4.1776
10.2973

for a Woman

4. Conclusions
All preceding results have been obtained under conservative assumptions. Also our calculations
assume that genetic testing leads to no medical benefits in the form of improved risk reduction.
There is some hope that women found to carry BRCA mutations can reduce their risk of BC
mortality by increased mammogram surveillance, prophylactic mastectomy, or chemoprevention
with tamoxifen. Therefore we believe that the figures in all tables of section are cautious upper
bounds of adverse selection costs. The main conclusion is that these costs are certainly
manageablefor the insurance industry. Only in a few cases (20-year term, family history of BC
with early ageat onset) does the cost exceed 10%. The average cost in a portfolio is likely to be
way below 10%. So the excess cost due to adverse selection is likely to be compensated by the
overall decreasein mortality rates (a factor not introduced in our calculations) that stands at 0.5%
per year these days.
This conclusion only holds if companies apply very tight underwriting standards. In the
applicationprocess, prospective insure& need to provide the detailed family history of all their
first-degree relatives, with ages at onset of any cancer. Applicants’ statements need to be
carefully checked by underwriters. If companies fail to correctly identify the family history of
the applicant,adverse selection costs could becomeunbearable.
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